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“The Origins of Social Justice in the Ancient Mesopotamian Religious Traditions”
Brian R. Doak
Presented at the American Schools of Oriental Research Central States Meeting
St. Louis, MO (April 2006)
Note: This paper was solicited from me as an entry in an introductory multi-volume
encyclopedia project on social justice in the world’s religious traditions. I presented it, polished
it up for publication, and then the whole project fell apart for some reason that I never
understood a few months after I submitted the piece. Since it will never see the light of day
otherwise, I post it here for whomever might find it useful.
(I) Introduction
The existence of written law in the ancient Near East predates the earliest legal codes of
other notable ancient civilizations, including those in China and India; thus, through the early
Mesopotamians, we are given the first actual historical glimpse of law as idealized and, in some
cases, practiced in human civilization. We also receive, via the Mesopotamian legal writings, the
earliest recorded answers to the complex questions engaging the greatest philosophers and social
thinkers for the past five millennia: Why treat people fairly? Who deserves to be protected in
society, and to what extent? What makes someone truly guilty of a crime? By what authority will
the state punish offenders? What is justice?
An immediate problem confronting those who wish to study Near Eastern law involves
the breadth and ambiguity of the category itself; the “Near East,” broadly speaking, and more
narrowly, “Mesopotamia” has been home to dozens of languages/dialects and distinct cultures
throughout the last 12,000 or so years of permanent settlement. Even so, most of the field’s
leading scholars claim that we can speak of “Near Eastern law” generally, based on what
Raymond Westbrook calls a “remarkable continuity in fundamental juridical concepts over the
course of three millennia” (2003: 4). Consequently, the law collections from the Near East share
a “legal ontology,” the evidence of which is present in some form (be it specific or in ideological
framework) in each text. The bulk of our materials come from the Old Babylonian (19th-16th
centuries BCE), Neo Babylonian (late 7th century-6th century BCE) and Persian (6th-4th centuries
BCE) periods, although materials referencing the quest for social justice are scattered throughout
all periods. In fact, many potentially key materials await discovery and/or translation at this
present time.
Nonetheless, we currently possess thousands of ancient documents wherein legal
materials are preserved and the demands for social justice articulated; formal “law codes”
(although the term “code” proves insufficient for a number of reasons) such as the famous stele
of Hammurabi (18th century BCE; hereafter LH), comprise only one important source of
information. Other evidence comes in the form of royal decrees and edicts, royal instructions,
trial records (propagated by scribal schools for academic purposes), lexical texts (“dictionaries,”
some devoted to legal terminology), written economic transactions, private letters and of course,
mythical literature. Justice (Akkadian mīšarum and Sumerian níg-si-sá) in Mesopotamia (along
with its approximate counterparts, šāphat and sedeqah in the Hebrew Bible) entails both the
alleviation of suffering for the poor, mistreated, and marginalized and the conviction and
punishment of the oppressors. Thus, the concept of “social justice” in Mesopotamia can refer
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broadly to any aspect of crime or punishment, for anyone who is considered “wronged” in any
circumstance. Justice does not only apply to the poor or marginalized, although these groups
(often represented by vulnerable individuals such as widows and orphans) are often highlighted
as most susceptible to abuse and therefore most in need of protection; even the worst of criminals
were offered protection in various circumstances (Westbrook 1995: 158).
(II) Why Act Justly? The Rationale for Social Justice
The search for a comprehensive logic or rationale behind the desire to ensure social
justice in the ancient Near East is destined to fall short of the goal. Mesopotamian juridical logic
is not “logic” in the Aristotelian sense; abstract concepts such as “equality,” “spirituality,” or
even “justice” per se are not defined in the ancient literature, nor did the Mesopotamians create
comprehensive categories and sub-divisions of these categories to address, at least in theory, an
exhaustive range of possible circumstances. These ancient legal materials, like the
Mesopotamian divinatory texts, are arranged in list format, sometimes strangely specific and
almost always casuistic in nature. Consider, for example, LH 25 (Richardson 2000: 29-134):
If there has been an outbreak of fire in a man’s house and a man who has gone to
put it out catches sight of the private possessions of the owner of the house and
takes them, that man shall be thrown into that same fire.
The nature of such a pronouncement is not that of a contemplative philosophy of law in the
modern sense. Clearly what we have here is a specific example of a judgment, by a judge
perhaps, or even the endorsement of a particular act of punishment which has already been done
and not a case presented to a legislature. Hammurabi’s laws are not merely a random sampling of
rulings selected from any one particular time period, however; in the form we now possess,
Hammurabi’s “code” could not have been possible until near the end of his 40 year reign, since
in the prologue of the stele the king implies that he controls the city of Ešnunna (P37ff.), which
had not occurred until his 38th year (Bottéro 1992: 165). Therefore the answers for “Why be
just,” in terms of the ancient Mesopotamian outlook, cannot be found in any abstract ancient
treatise on the subject of fairness or social justice. Instead, we are forced to cull amongst the
extant cuneiform literature for evidence of the rationale for social justice.
Justice and the Gods, Justice and the King. The Mesopotamians, like all ancient humans
(or at least the ones who have left us written records), sought to anchor their most cherished
values in the realm of the immutable (Irani 1995: 2). Regarding the question, “Where do justice
and the law come from?” ancient Mesopotamians did not rely on what we would call “secular”
explanations or justifications based on “natural law” or “human rights,” all of which are
innovations of the post-Enlightenment world. Likewise, equating the search for justice with
essentially “religious” goals as opposed to other categories (political, economic, etc.) proves
inadequate since our modern notions of personal “spirituality” are incompatible with the ancient
cultural-religious milieu. Worshipping the deities, for an ancient Mesopotamian, was not an
avenue through which one might routinely express his/her personal creativity, relegated to the
“secular” sphere of citizenry which is “separate” (to use contemporary political lingo) from the
political life of the village or city. Rather, the ideal explanation for “Why be just” is grounded in
the divine order; the gods are just, and therefore we will be just (although, on several occasions,
the gods appear to act in completely arbitrary manners). External powers are imagined to inspire
the drive and the “religious,” the “political,” the “personal,” and the group are all intertwined
with one another. In the introduction to her seminal work, Purity and Danger, anthropologist
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Mary Douglas phrases the issue this way when speaking about beliefs regarding contagion,
danger and social order (1966: 3-4):
These danger-beliefs are as much threats which one man uses to coerce another as
dangers which he himself fears to incur by his own lapses from righteousness.
They are a strong language of mutual exhortation. At this level the laws of nature
are dragged in to sanction the moral code: this kind of disease is caused by
adultery, that by incest; this meteorological disaster is the effect of political
disloyalty, that the effect of impiety. The whole universe is harnessed to men’s
attempts to force one another into good citizenship.
Our earliest written collection of juridical concepts is the so-called Code of Ur-Nammu,
inscribed sometime during the last century of the 3rd millennium BCE (see Roth 1995). In the
prologue (which is well preserved), Ur-Nammu calls himself a “might warrior” and immediately
extols himself for establishing a generous set of offerings (barley, sheep, butter, etc.) as regular
offerings in the prominent temple. The divine patron of Ur, the moon god Nanna, is said to have
received the kingdom from his parents, An and Enlil, and thus it is passed to Ur-Nammu the
human leader. Ur-Nammu boasts a variety of accomplishments, which include regulating
riverboat traffic, providing generous set offerings for the deities, standardizing various weights
and measures and a variety of other things. Near the beginning of his prologue, Ur-Nammu
probably appealed to the god of justice, Utu, for inspiration in the field of social justice: “[by the
might] of the god Nanna, my lord, [by the true command of the god Utu(?)], I established [justice
in the land (?)]” (Roth 1995: 15).
Indeed, Ur-Nammu makes a series of further claims which relate directly to the treatment
of the weak and easily-oppressed:
I did not deliver the orphan to the rich. I did not deliver the widow to the mighty. I
did not deliver the man with but one shekel to the man with one mina [i.e. 60
shekels]. I did not deliver the man with but one sheep to the man with one ox.
Ur-Nammu ends the prologue with the optimistic claim that he has “eliminated enmity, violence,
and cries for justice. I established justice in the land.” A little over a century after Ur-Nammu,
Lipit-Ishtar (c. 1934-1924 BCE) consolidated the political and military resources of southern
Mesopotamia and established Isin as an important cultic center (Roth 1995: 23). Lipit-Ishtar, the
self-proclaimed “wise shepherd” of the land, claims to receive authority from An and Enlil to
“establish justice in the land, to eliminate cries for justice, to eradicate enmity and armed
violence.” Kings often took advantage of their early rule to elaborate on ideal visions of
complete justice and improvement throughout the land, much like a modern political leader who
uses his/her inaugural speech to outline a series of (often unrealistic) goals and ideals for their
tenure in office. By conquering and organizing various cities in southern Mesopotamia, LipitIshtar is able to claim that he has “liberated the sons and daughters” of Nippur, Ur, Isin and the
entire lands of Sumer and Akkad, “who were subjugated [by the yoke(?)], and I restored order.
With a … decree(?) I made the father support his children, I made the child support his father. I
made the father stand by his children, I made the child stand by his father” (Roth 1995). It is hard
to know exactly what kind of reform Lipit-Ishtar had in mind, or how such things could be
practically enforced. Perhaps he meant to refer to certain decrees elaborated later in the
inscription in paragraph 31 (Roth 1995: 32):
If a father, during his lifetime, gives his favored son a gift for which he writes a
sealed document, after the father has died the heirs shall divide the (remaining)
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paternal estate; they will not contest the share which was allotted, they will not
repudiate their father’s word.
The epilogue seals the authority of Lipit-Ishtar’s decrees with the authority of the “true word of
the god Utu.”
Ancient Mesopotamian polytheism fostered a view of divinity wherein responsibility for
various spheres of human concern was delegated to a variety of divine powers; to neglect
worship or reverence for any particular deity would thus constitute a fundamental neglect for the
realm of human experience embodied by that deity. A particular deity may stake a claim to rule
the divine assembly through promising to establish justice where other deities have failed. For
example, the biblical Psalm 82:3-4 describes the West Semitic Israelite deity, YHWH, rising
above his competitors and establishing justice (Hebrew šāpat). YHWH supplants the other gods,
who are considered ineffective and negligent of their divine duties and is then called upon to rise
up and “judge the earth.” For the ancient Mesopotamians, it was Shamash/UTU who embodied
the ideals of social justice. Toward the end of the 2nd millennium BCE, an Akkadian text
celebrating Shamash was composed. Elements of this so-called “Hymn to Shamash” highlight
the role of the sun-god as sponsor of justice and overseer of human affairs (Bottéro 1992: 20910):
Shamash, illuminator of the entire heaven, who lightens the darkness….
Your rays grasp everything that is hidden,
and the behavior of humans is revealed by your light!....
Perched on the highest mountains you inspect the world and,
from the midst of heaven, you balance the universe….
You shepherd all living beings;
to the upper and the lower regions you are the only shepherd….
Another revealing passage presents Shamash as the helper of the oppressed and gives, in the
words of Carlo Zaccagnini, “an almost complete roll of the recurrent miseries suffered by the
lower social strata of the ancient Near East” (1994: 283).
You, Shamash, listen to prayer, supplication and benediction, obeisance, kneeling,
ritual murmurs and prostration. The person of low status invokes you from the
depth of his mouth. The humble, the weak, the afflicted, the poor, the mother
whose son is captive constantly and unceasingly pray to you. He whose family is
remote, whose city is distant, the shepherd amid the terror of the steppe prays to
you, the herdsman in warfare, the keeper of sheep among enemies.
Shamash makes a good candidate for “deity of social justice” since from his daily orbit he
observes the vista of the known universe and its inhabitants, great and small, king and slave,
male and female, living and dead. The reliability and predictability of the sun also makes the
Shamash an appropriate representative for justice, since the needs of the community are reborn
every day and must be met with continual and steadfast responses (Nel 2000: 145). Shamash’s
divine offspring, Kittum (“Truth”) and Misharum (“Equity,” “Justice”) attest his ability to
reproduce the elements of justice and equality in both the divine and human realms.
The ancient iconography often depicts Shamash holding a pruning saw (šaššaru), sitting
in judgment as rays of the sun radiate from his shoulders. In one Akkadian period cylinder seal,
Shamash sits enthroned before a set of scales, tipping the balance of justice (presumably) in
accordance with the petitions of his worshippers, who bring an animal offering before the god
(Black 1992: 182-4). The image of the scales also played an important role in ancient Egyptian
concepts of justice (ma’at); in iconographic scenes accompanying the text of the Book of the
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Dead the Egyptians often depicted a heart being weighed in the balance against the requirements
of ma’at, represented by a feather (Morschauser 1995: 106). This idea of the scale, of balance, is
itself fundamental to the Mesopotamian understanding social justice. As Westbrook states,
“social justice was regarded in the ancient Near East as the preservation of the status quo—as the
privileges owed to each citizen as member of a family unit with a certain recognized
socioeconomic status. Where those privileges were lost through an act of oppression, certain
mechanisms were available to restore the balance” (1995: 161; c.f. Foster 1995: 168).
Early in his prologue, Hammurabi associates himself closely with Shamash. The king
claims he will “rise like Shamash over the mass of humanity, illuminating the land,” and that he
will “listen obediently to Shamash, who powerfully fixes the foundations of Sippar” (Richardson
2000: 31). Shining-sun imagery is then used of the king again in the epilogue, where Hammurabi
declares that he has “made the light shine” for his people, and that his justice will “shine over the
land” under the direction of Shamash, and so on. Indeed, the diorite stele upon which
Hammurabi’s legal examples are posted displays Hammurabi as the obedient disciple of
Shamash, attending the deity who sits powerfully on a throne (Frankfort 1989: 119; Michalowski
1990: 62). Hammurabi does not claim divinity for himself directly, but he is clearly positioned
with the attributes of various deities invoked by the inscription. As the primary and authoritative
living image of the deities on earth, Near Eastern monarchs presented themselves as the
guarantors of divine justice. Mesopotamian kings, with a few notable exceptions, did not
proclaim themselves outright as actual divinities, but their role is nonetheless cemented into the
fabric of the universe, like the idea of the social order and the deities themselves. Hammurabi
claims to have been ordained by Anu and Enlil specifically with the purpose of establishing
“justice within the land” and “to stop the mighty exploiting the weak” (Richardson 2000: 30-1).
We are reminded of the intimate connection in ancient Mesopotamia between the monarch and
the gods—if the gods are perceived as demanding social justice, the king as the gods’
representative on earth must also establish justice.
Much can be said regarding whether or not the deities themselves actually exhibit justice
or fairness in their dealings, or whether the king followed suit with sundry abuses and
inconsistencies of his own accord. In his important work comparing social justice in the ancient
Near East and in ancient Israel, Moshe Weinfeld claims that the Mesopotamians instituted social
reforms solely “to win over the hearts of the people,” and held “no genuine concern for
improving the lot of the poor among their people” (1995: 10). Weinfeld constantly seeks to draw
distinctions between Mesopotamian and Israelite notions of “freedom,” the latter of which he
supposes are born out of “purely religious” notions, whereas the Mesopotamians sought to free
slaves from their lowly positions only so that they could serve as slaves to the gods and priests in
the temples (1995: 11). The inscription of Maništušu (2100s BCE), king of Akkad, claims that
Maništušu “freed thirty-eight cities from corvée and from levy, that they might serve on behalf of
the temple of the god Shamash alone” and can be cited to illustrate this point (Weinfeld 1995:
16). Although any society which keeps slaves can hardly be viewed as one exhibiting “social
justice” at all to our modern ears, we must remember that slavery in the ANE is a relative term,
and thus was “used relatively to describe one’s relationship to any hierarchical superior”
(Westbrook 1995: 149). A household may own slaves, all citizens are slaves to the king, and all
humans are slaves to the deities. Still, outright slaver was common in many periods, as those
captured in war or debtors formed the main base of slave labor.
To be sure, the cultural-religious matrix of the ancient Near East precluded the possibility
for radical social reform based on ideal principles in most circumstances. Ancient Near Eastern
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kings, like their modern political counterparts around the world, sought favor and support
through a variety of campaign promises and official decrees. One method involved proclaiming a
general mīšarum, or “decree of equity” (Westbrook 2003: 407; Greengus 2000). This decree
would have involved the freeing of debt-slaves from their current service as a “goodwill”
gesture, as well as the forgiveness of debts in general. A similar type of decree called a šūdūtu
(“decree, edict, proclamation”) can be found in the Nuzi archives (1450-1340 BCE) and also
involves “the protection or occasional release of people who, for different reasons, were in a
state of servitude” (Zaccagnini 2003: 566). Various other forms of release from debt and/or debt
slavery also fall under this category. We would be justified to voice some suspicion regarding the
nature and effectiveness of these decrees, or ponder skeptically as to whether or not they
produced real social benefits for people. Some scholars have even wondered whether such
“social reforms” actually favored wealthy lenders (even if unintentionally) by lowering the price
of land and causing high, short-term interest rates (Foster 1995: 167-8).
Still, the kind of cynicism toward the Mesopotamian materials displayed by some
commentators (e.g. Weinfeld, as cited above, and Epsztein, below) is not warranted. For
example, Weinfeld proceeds to contrast Maništušu’s temple slavery with Lev. 25.25 (“If one of
your countrymen becomes poor and sells some of his property, his nearest relative is to come and
redeem what his countryman has sold.”) This is certainly a lofty ideal, but we do not have any
more evidence that such redemptions were carried out in First Temple Israel than we do for the
improved state of the poor during Maništušu’s reign. In fact, the 8th century prophetic
condemnations of Hosea, Amos, and Isaiah all seem to assume that such provisions (as in Lev.
25.25) were not effectively carried out. And what of the assertion that social justice in
Mesopotamia is not done on “purely religious” grounds, as Weinfeld claims for Israel’s laws? By
what criteria does one make these distinctions? Léon Epsztein also declares that “justice in Israel
more than elsewhere has a basically religious stamp” (1986: 104). Israel’s king is not accorded
divinity, Epsztein claims, and the implication is then apparently that the king would be “lessoppressive” and would remain “a chief among equals.” David seems to have judged cases from
time to time (2Sam 14), but the fact that we do not yet possess anything like a “law code” from
any Israelite monarch, combined with the hoary and convoluted debate about the antiquity of the
sources of the Torah make it very problematic to make sweeping historical judgments about the
role of Israel’s king vis-à-vis the law.
Perhaps one of the earliest recorded attempts at a “social reform” by a monarch was
carried out in the 3rd millennium by Uruinimgina/Urukagina (c. 2300 BCE). The meaning and
text of Uruinimgina’s reform has caused ample puzzlement among scholars, but enough can be
discerned to affirm that we have here some attempt at programmatic social reversals (translated
by Foster 1995: 173-4):
(1) From the distant days, from the very beginning, boatman would take
possession of boat, herdsman would take possession of donkey, shepherd would
take possession of sheep…
(2) The gods’ cattle plowed the ruler’s onion patch…
(7) From the boundary of Ningirsu, as far as the sea there were inspectors. The
(servile class called) “subordinate to the king” dug wells at the side of their fields
and took possession of blinded people (for labor), they took blinded people for the
irrigation ditches which were in the fields.
These were the practices then…
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Uruinimagina then proceeds to tell how things have changed, although it is not always clear why
things have changed, or if the changes are for the better or for the general populous. For
example, in the supposedly new era, “Boatman was removed from boat, herdsman was removed
from donkeys and sheep,” and so forth. “From the border of Ningirsu to the sea no one was
inspector” (Foster 1995: 173-4). Although, as Foster suggests, it is possible that Uruinimagina is
only trying to strengthen his position over and against the temples, “he is at least a candidate for
the category ‘social reformer’“ (1995: 169).
On a formal level, the role of precedent seems to be somewhat minimal for the monarch’s
establishment of justice and law. We have only two apparent examples of a clear deferral to
something like formal precedent, recorded in the fallout of the so-called Temple Sermon of
Jeremiah (Jeremiah 26.17) and in the epilogue of Hammurabi’s Laws, where the king himself
suggests that his judgments be used as precedent for future rulings (Richardson 2000: 123):
I have written these very special words of mine on this stone;
I have set them together with the image of me, the king of justice….
so that disputes may be settled in the land,
so that decisions may be made in the land,
so that the oppressed may be treated properly….
Let any man oppressed, anyone who has a complaint,
come before this statue of the king of justice
and let him have the message on the stone read aloud,
and let him listen to the treasured words I have written,
and may my stela resolve his complaint….
let this stela explain to him the customs and traditions,
the social problems I encountered
and the decisions I have taken for the community.
These examples are the exception and not the rule. Beginning in the Hellenistic period, however,
we see an explosion of citations to earlier law, and from this time forward written precedent and
abstract legal principles become increasingly important (Westbrook 2003: 19).
Justice and the Village. Another sometimes neglected context of ancient Near Eastern
law involves the operation of legal principles at the level of the village. In fact, this local setting
provides the most important framework for understanding the Mesopotamian impulse to provide
social justice since it is the basic social unit (intermixed with that of the family) wherein the vast
majority of individuals lived their lives. The image of the family unit provided the fundamental
imagery for all societal relations and obligations, so that the king served as “father” for the
greater population and took on the burden of providing justice as the family father ensured right
relationships at the most intimate level of social life (Westbrook 1995, 151).
Again, we should be reminded that the orality of law in the ancient Near Eastern social
context is paramount—we have little or no evidence that indicates written codes, in isolation,
held independent legal authority; one leading interpreter suggests the written documents are
really nothing more than “protocols of oral transactions” (Westbrook 2003: 19). As such, the
practice of justice in Mesopotamia was not bound by bureaucracy as it would be in later time
periods. The relationship between “formal law” and practice was fluid and allowed for the kind
of flexibility necessary to meet local needs, though in many cases probably at the expense of
consistency.
Regarding this connection between law and practice, we have almost no direct reference
linking the physical law collections and the practice of individuals or rulers. A notable exception

8
occurs in an Old Babylonian letter (published only in two dissertations) referencing a narû (Akk.
for “stela”) upon which the author describes wages for textile workers. After quoting a series of
wages for various workers, the author maintains that the “wages for a hired worker are recorded
on the stela. In accordance with what they spoke to you, either grain or in silver, do not withhold
their wages! And when I come there, I will investigate the matter personally and I will deduct
their wages from the work assignment (Roth 1995: 6). Apparently the narû carries some amount
of weight as a reference tool and could be used in an attempt to cow over the transgressors with
official-sounding rhetoric. But in the end, the real emphasis falls on the threat of a personal
investigation by the author. The strength of an enforcing personality, whether it be a “judge” or
the body of local authorities (as was often the case), apparently trumped the effect of official
attempts at centralized law. The individual judge (whether king-appointed or simply recognized
by his/her community for wisdom) occupied a critical role and had to possess the proper
attributes. As Westbrook states (2003: 87),
The qualities of a judge included not only probity, but also a heightened sense of
right and justice, and a special regard for the weaker elements of society. Indeed,
a greater stress was laid upon these qualities than in modern society, and for good
reason. Modern law relies upon the absence of personal interest and adherence to
the letter of the law to ensure the objectivity of its judges. Ancient judges, often
administrators and wealthy local landowners, were not shielded from personal
interest in disputes or from acquaintance with the parties, and could not seek
refuge in the strict wording of legal texts. It therefore fell to personal qualities to
achieve the same ends.
In other words, the ancient village legal context did not permit the anonymity and “objectivity”
associated with our own modern legal systems. Ancient Mesopotamian officials probably were
not able to preserve for themselves the kind of distance from other humans which is afforded to
politicians today; ancient Mesopotamia did not have cities of millions of people who could be
separated by miles of concrete or high-rise buildings.
Prominent community members other than the king served in the local context as the
primary sponsors of justice for the poor and oppressed. In the Aqhat Epic (Ugarit, 14th century
BCE), the patriarchal figure Daniel is observed is his “normal,” “daily” life (apart from making
deals with gods/goddess and offering sacrifices) playing the role of judge at the city gate and
threshing floor (Parker 1997: 58):
Now Daniel, man of Rapiu,
The hero, man of the Harnemite,
Gets up and sits by the gateway,
Among the chiefs on the threshing floor;
Takes care of the case of the widow,
Defends the need of the orphan. (Col. V.4-8)
Although this depiction is perhaps an overstated attempt to show Daniel as the ideal leader and
wise elder, the role of local officials is primary and the ideal male elder is attentive to the needs
of those who are unlike himself, i.e. weak and marginalized. This is not to diminish the role of
the ancient Near Eastern state or the king in providing legal boundaries and attempting to secure
social justice for its citizens. Rather, we must recognize the fundamentally local and personal
nature of ensuring justice in the Mesopotamian context. Although some kings are indeed
depicted as hearing cases personally, this occurred on a limited scale; many significant decisions
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in and around the capital city were rendered by ruler-appointed representatives or local judges,
even though, officially, “justice was a royal prerogative” (Bottéro 1992: 165).
Practically speaking, there is quite a difference between the direct methods of punishment
and those who are permitted to carry out a sentence in the ancient Mesopotamian context and
today. Whereas modern executions for murder take place with some anonymity (i.e. judges,
jurists and executioners are usually not family members of the deceased), the wronged family in
ancient Mesopotamia could take up the task of executing the offender directly. Two stark
examples from the Middle Assyrian Laws (c. 1076 BCE) should suffice here (Roth 1995):
A10: [If either] a man or a woman enters [another man’s] house and kills [either a
man] or a woman, [they shall hand over] the manslayers [to the head of the
household]; if he so chooses, he shall kill them….
A16: If a man [should fornicate] with the wife of a man […by] her invitation,
there is no punishment for the man; the man (i.e. husband) shall impose whatever
punishment he chooses upon his wife….
The entire “legal framework,” then, is not centralized, but is bound up in village political
structure and the prevailing gender hierarchies. Likewise, the ideals of social justice could not
have taken on a purely (or even ideally) “religious” intonation since the realities of justice and
inequality on the village level must have been confronted in intimate settings among humans
who could not easily remain anonymous or distanced from each other. The famous lex talionis,
or “law of reciprocity,” articulated with the principle of an “eye for an eye,” acutely reflects the
local context of law, where both perpetrator and victim were likely acquainted with each other in
some way before the crime (in a large majority of cases, this is still true today). The eye for an
eye principle plays an important symbolic role, besides acting as a deterrent, by setting the act of
injury within the context of personal equality.
LH 196: If a man has destroyed the sight of another similar person, they shall
destroy his sight. 197: If he has broken another man’s bone, they shall break one
of his bones. (Richardson 2000: 105)
Of course, this equality is tainted, by our modern perspectives, by the fact that the lex
talionis only applies between equals. The next law, LH 198, spells this out clearly: “If he has
destroyed the sight of a muškēnum [dependent, serf, commoner—as opposed to an awīlum] or
broken a bone of a muškēnum, he shall pay one mana of silver.” The ancient world allowed for
little or no “social mobility” (on our modern sense of the phrase) save for exceptional cases;
Sargon’s legendary birth narrative provides the needed justification for such a shift, as does king
David’s in the Hebrew Bible. Furthermore, ancient Near Eastern law did not consistently
distinguish social status when meting out social justice, although this is not always the case. An
exception occurs in LH, wherein the stele makes a distinction between an awīlum (citizen, free
person) and a muškēnum. Consider LH 202-204 (Richardson 2000):
202. If an awīlum has struck the cheek of a man who is more important than he,
he shall be struck in the council 60 times with an ox tail.
203. If one awīlum has struck the check of another such man of similar status [i.e.,
another awīlum], he shall pay one mana of silver.
204. If a muškēnum has struck the cheek of another muškēnum, he shall pay ten
shekels of silver.
Payments for injury (as reflected in LH, the laws of Ur-Nammu or the so-called “Hittite
Code”) can be difficult to negotiate—how much, exactly, is an eye or a foot or a hand worth?
Monetary payments do not solve all problems. Take for example, LH 21: “If a man has smashed
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a way into a house, they shall kill him by hanging him just where he broke in.” This kind of
solution is gritty, personal and local. In this situation, there is no room given for multi-year trials
or government programs of reform and rehabilitation. Rather, there is a basic assumption that the
households and village hierarchy is sufficient to meet the needs of the wronged and provide
adequate responses to social problems.
(III) Conclusions: Wisdom and the Vision of Social Justice
Despite the confident words of ancient monarchs, justice was never easy and never
guaranteed for anyone. Alongside the proclamations of ancient Mesopotamian kings stands
another body of literature that sometimes presents the need for social justice and the reality of
achieving justice through a very different lens, namely, wisdom literature. Whereas the biblical
Proverbists are generally optimistic about the inherent justice in the world, the reality of attaining
justice is often questioned in the Near Eastern wisdom materials, even while their authors usually
extol the value of ensuring justice for the weak. Take, for example, the debate between a master
and a slave in the enigmatic Dialogue of Pessimism. This short work, written in Akkadian
cuneiform sometime after the 12th century BCE, seems to meditate, playfully, on the futility of
human effort and achievement. Take, for example, this paradoxically humorous conversation
between a master and a slave regarding revolutionary ventures (translation from Bottéro 1992:
254-5):
Slave, listen to me!—Here I am, master, here I am!
—I want to lead a revolution!—So lead, master, lead!
If you do not lead a revolution, where will [your clo]thes come from?
And who will enable you to fill your b[elly]?
—O well, slave, I do not want to lead a revolution!
—[Do not lead, master, do not lead a revolution!]
The man who leads a revolution is either killed, or flayed,
Or has his eyes put out, or is arrested and thrown in jail!
Here, the slave goads his master on to rebellion; the slave’s remarks concerning why a
revolution is needed are instructive. “If you do not lead a revolution, where will your clothes
come from? And who will enable you to fill your belly?” The implication here is perhaps that
one cannot expect to be clothed and fed properly short of a formal revolution, when clothing for
the naked and food for the destitute must be taken by force (although one would presume here
that the master can secure his own clothing and food, while the slave represents one who
cannot!). Utopias are not in need of insurgencies. But when the fickle master changes his mind,
the slave accurately points out the high cost of resistance in an authoritarian state. Apparently,
from the author’s historical point of view, the ideals of peace and justice were discarded
routinely, and no amount of insurrection or force could change the situation. Thus the master
moves on to a new idea:
Slave, listen to me!—Here I am, master, here I am!
—I want to perform a public benefit for my country!
[one variant states: “I want to distribute free food rations to my country”]
—So do it master, do it!
The man who performs a public benefit for his country,
His actions are “exposed” to the “circle” of Marduk [i.e. Marduk will reward this
individual]
—O well, slave, I do not want to perform a public benefit for my country!
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—Do not perform, master, do not perform!
Go up the ancient tells and walk about,
See the mixed skulls of plebeians and nobles:
Which is the malefactor, and which is the benefactor? (Bottéro 1992: 256)
In this exchange, the master again travels a journey from optimism to pessimism, from
action to inaction, which culminates again in the amusing confirmation of the master’s wishes by
the slave. The joy of ensuring social justice, through public benefits or free giveaways, is negated
by the slave’s mockery of human justice; the bones of the rich and the poor are indiscernible in
the dust. There is a certain element of humor in all of this, to be sure. But the line between the
silly and the serious is sometimes razor thin, as it is for the author of the Dialogue.
The fact that line 76 of the Dialogue (“Go up the ancient tells and walk about”) also
serves as an inclusio for the well-known Epic of Gilgamesh, mentioned prominently at the
beginning and end of Gilgamesh’s famous journey, is both ironic and poignant in its application
to the quest for social justice. As king Gilgamesh’s journey for immortality takes him from
extreme ambition to an acceptance of his limited role as a human, so too our author of the
Dialogue moves us through the extremes of human ideals but does not settle for trite answers. If
anything, the master in the Dialogue becomes paralyzed to the point of inactivity, and in the end
of the poem, to the point of contemplating suicide. As Bottéro points out, the author of the
Dialogue emphasizes the difference between gods and humans, and “stresses continuously the
limits of human intelligence…we never have the last word, including that regarding the pure
meaning of the world, of our activities, and of our existence. Others know it, higher than us, and
that should suffice to keep us tranquil” (Bottéro 1992: 267). Similarly, the reader of Gilgamesh is
compelled to see the mysteries and even caprice of divinity, and for better or for worse, the
citizens of Uruk must look to strong-men like Gilgamesh to ensure fair treatment, though they
may not receive it. Although the deities’ role in ensuring social justice is emphasized in some
monumental inscriptions, even the greatest mythical materials of the ancient Mesopotamian
traditions point the reader toward the mundane and yet vital contexts of the family, city and
village as the foci of judgment and fair social treatment.
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